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Organization Submissions under the
Environmental Side Agreement:
Foundations, Justiciability and Implications
for Future Challenges
by Marcus j Williams'
I. Introduction.
During the debate over ratification of the NAFTA, some members of the U.S.
Congress decried the NAFs potential for adverse impacts on the U.S. economy, as well
as upon business and industrial interests in all three signatory countries.' Perhaps no fore-
casts were more ominous than the threats that the NAFTA and the Environmental Side
Agreement would provide too little - or too much - environmental protection, with dis-
astrous results to the economy or the environment.' During late 1995, the North
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation [hereinafter, the "Commission"]
was afforded its first opportunities to demonstrate its role in the operation of the NAFTA.
Contrary to the fears of some, and to the chagrin of others, the Commission quietly hand-
ed down several decisions which may indicate a well-reasoned and deliberate approach to
the environmental issues being addressed to the Commission. However, this approach is
unlikely to appease conservative politicians in the U.S., and is certain to meet with strong
opposition from environmental groups in all three Party nations.
1. Candidate, Juris Doctor, Southern Methodist University, Class of 1997. The author wishes to
express appreciation to Mr. Marc Paquin and Ms. Natalie Dost at the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation in Montreal, Quebec, for their assistance in obtaining the petition
of Comite Para la Proteccion de los Recursos Naturales, et al., Submission 96-001 (January 17,
1996). The author also wishes to express his gratitude to Ms. Lara Saldivar of the Editorial Staff
for her cogent and timely translation of that submission.
2. See, e.g., 139 Cong. Rec. S16974-02, S16975 (November 22, 1993) (remarks of Sen. D'Amato).
Proceedings and Debates of the 103rd Congress, 1st Sess., North American Free Trade
Agreement
3. 139 Cong. Rec. S16622-01, S16628 (November 20, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Riegle). Proceedings
and Debates of the 103rd Congress, 1st Sess., North American Free Trade Agreement. The gen-
eral tone of arguments opposing the ratification of the NAFTA were, like Senator Riegle's,
depicting a flood of lost American jobs which would cascade to Mexico as a result of that coun-
try's purported lack of environmental protections. See New pacts break logjam on trade
NAFTA: Side deals may ease passage in Congress, Los Angeles Times (August 14, 1993), 1.
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This comment will discuss briefly the formation and basic structure of both the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation' and the Commission, including the
compromises which molded the document in its current form. It will then review several
recent decisions handed down by the Commission, and will dose with a discussion of the
possibilities for the future of the Environmental Side Agreement and the Commission.
II Creation of the Environmental Side Agreement and the Commission
A. BACKGROUND
To a large extent, the Environmental Side Agreement was created to address environ-
mentalists' concerns that the NAFTA would result in an overall weakening of international
environmental law.' The primary concern appears to have been that the NAFTA posed an
increased risk of harm to the environment by liberalizing trade among the United States,
Canada, and particularly Mexico. Environmental groups feared that the "harmonization"
of environmental standards across borders would result in an overall decrease in the sub-
stantive standards of the more environmentally sensitive nations to correspond to those
with fewer protections. This fear was based upon an assumption that Mexico had substan-
tively weaker environmental protections than the United States or Canada!
This perception was not entirely accurate. Indeed, a 1991 study by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency found that Mexico's General Law for Ecological
Equilibrium and Environmental Protection was substantively quite similar to the United
States' environmental laws." Mexico's environmental laws provide scientific standards
regarding the production, storage, shipment and disposal of hazardous wastes, and pre-
scribe criminal and civil sanctions for their violation." The weakness in Mexican environ-
4. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the Government of
Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States, and the Government of the United
States of America , Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter
Environmental Side Agreement].
5. Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA
Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC as a Model for Future Accords, 25 Envtl. L. 31 (1995).
6. New days dawn for U.S., Mexico; Despite trade benefits, many Mexicans resent the way some
Americans think of them, Orlando Sentinel (November 19, 1993).
7. North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug. 12, 1992, revised Sept 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1,1994) [ hereinafter NAFTA], Article 906.
8. See, e.g., Poll shows deep split on NAFTA, San Diego Union-Tribune, (September 27,1993).
9. Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y la Protecci6n al Ambiente Cited in, 412 Diaro Oficial de la
Federaci6n 23 (January 28,1988) [hereinafter, Ley General].
10. Office of the General Counsel, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Evaluation of
Mexico's Environmental Laws and Regulations: Interim Report of EPA Findings, ii (November
22, 1991).
11. Lynn A. Stanton, A Comparative Analysis of the NAFTA's Environmental Side Agreement, 2
Hastings W. N.W. Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 71, 73 (1994).
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mental law was not in its substance, but in its enforcement of those laws; Mexico's per
capita expenditures for enforcement of environmental laws traditionally have amounted to
approximately 2% of U.S. levels."
However, since 1990, largely as a result of environmental agreements with the United
States, Mexico has significantly increased its expenditures for environmental law enforce-
ment." A significant portion of those efforts have been directed - again, in part as a
result of pressure from the United States - at reduction of pollution from factories near
the U.S.-Mexico border.' By way of example, Van Pelt notes that between 1989 and 1994,
the Mexican government shut down over 2,000 factories for violations of pollution laws,
and recent efforts have included an increase in the number of environmental inspectors
from 50 to 250 over that same period.s
B. NAFTA ENViRoNmENmrA PROViSIONS
The preamble and the general language of the NAFTA make it clear that the treaty is a
trade agreement, not an environmental agreement. Its purposes are to "contribute to the
harmonious development and expansion of world trade and provide a catalyst to broader
international cooperation," and to "create an expanded and secure market for the goods
and services,' while doing so "in a manner consistent with environmental protection and
conservation."6
However, the NAFTA places greater emphasis on the environment than any interna-
tional trade agreement in history," attempting to balance the enhancement of health, safe-
ty and the environment with its stated objective of removing barriers to free trade.'8 The
treaty is directed toward promoting "sustainable development" while strengthening "the
development and enforcement of environmental laws." 9 In contrast, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade requires signatories to ensure their environmental protec-
tions meet a "least restrictive means" standard, thereby subordinating environmental pro-
tections to free trade interests."
12. id. at 72.
13. Laura J. Van Pelt, Comment, Countervailing Environmental Subsidies: A Solution to the
Environmental Inequities of the North American Free Trade Agreemen; 29 Tex. Int'l LJ. 123, 133
(1994). See also, Jill A. Kotvis, The Mexican Environment after NAFTA: Doing Business with
Mexico under NAFTA; Environmental and Enforcement Issues, given at Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Foundation, International Bar Association Section on Energy & Natural Resource Law
(February 13, 1995), at 2 (on file with Author).
14. Van Pelt, supra.
15. Iat 127, note 38.
16. NAFTA Preamble.
17. Bradley J. Condon, NAFTA and the Environment A Trade-Friendly Approach, 14 Nw. J. Int'l L.
& Bus. 528.
18. Stefan R. Miller, Comment, NAFTA: A Model for Reconciling the Conflict between Free Trade
and Environmental Protection, 56 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 483,509 (1994).
19. NAFITA Preamble.
20. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature January 1, 1948, T.ILA.S. No.
1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194, as amended [hereinafter, GATT].
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The NAFTA specifically allows nations to adopt and maintain standards for the pro-
tection of life, health and the environment, and to enact such sanctions as may be neces-
sary to effect such protections. '" Nations may also adopt or amend domestic environmen-
tal protections, even though such modifications would involve added restrictions on trade,
so long as the protective measures are aimed at legitimate health and safety concerns."
Critics of the NAFTA emphasize that the agreement focuses on avoiding the use of
trade barriers disguised as environmental protections, and fails to provide specific envi-
ronmental goals and sanctions." Under the NAFTA, a nation may cite environmental pro-
tection as a legitimate objective for actions which result in a limitation on trade, provided
that the nation imposing the protective nature can establish that such measures are not
simply protectionist measures."
During the 1992 Presidential campaign, in response to pressures from environmental
groups, the Clinton team took a position favoring greater protections for the environment
as a condition to support for NAFTA enabling legislation. These factors gave rise to pro-
posals which would eventually become the Environmental Side Agreement."
C. THE E vmoimErL. SIDE AGREsamE
There are widely conflicting views over the potential costs and benefits of the
Environmental Side Agreement. Environmentalists point to a lack of objective standards
for environmental protection, noting that the agreement calls only for the enforcement of
each nation's existing environmental laws.' In part, such views are based upon the mis-
perception of the adequacy of Mexico's environmental laws, as discussed above. However,
environmentalists also point to the admittedly weak language of Article 2(3): "[each]
Party shall consider prohibiting the export ... of a pesticide or toxic substance whose [sic]
use is prohibited within the Party's territory." (Emphasis added). Supporters of the duties
imposed under the Environmental Side Agreement will insist that inclusion in the NAFTA
of more specific requirements would amount to an invalid encroachment on the sover-
eignty of the member nations.27
21. NAFTA Article 904(1).
22. NAFTA Article 904(2).
23. Id. See, Jack 1. Garvey, Trade Law & Quality of Life - Dispute Resolution under the NAFTA Side
Accords on Labor and the Environment; 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 439,447 (1995).
24. NAFTA Article 904(4), Article 2101. Note, however, that the nation imposing the limitation
will bear the burden of showing that its action is related to a "legitimate objective," and that it is
not simply a disguised restraint on trade.
25. Stefan R. Miller, Comment, NAFTA: A Model for Reconciling the Conflict between Free Trade
and Environmental Protection, 56 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 483, 513-514 (1994).
26. See Garvey, supra note 23, at 447; Van Pelt, supra note 13, at 130.
27. Proceedings and Debates of the 103rd Congress, 1st Sess., North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, remarks of Congressman Mineta, 139 Cong. Rec. H9875-01,
H10027 (November 17, 1993).
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D. NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENUAL COOPERATION
1. Structure and Functions of the Commission
The Environmental Side Agreement functions through the North American
Commission on Environmental Cooperation, which is made up of the Council, the
Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee.2 ' Governing authority under the
Environmental Side Agreement is vested primarily in the Council,' which is made up of
one cabinet or ministerial representative, or their equivalent, from each Party."0 The
Environmental Side Agreement call for annual meetings of the Council," as well as a
review of operations and effectiveness of the Agreement to take place four years after the
signing of the Agreement." Article 10(1) also provides that the Council is to "oversee the
implementation and develop recommendations on the further elaboration of [the]
Agreement," and "address questions and differences that may arise between the Parties"
under the Agreement.
The Council is given the authority under Article 10(2) to recommend, among other
things, the use of economic instruments for the pursuit of domestic and internationally
agreed environmental objectives. To this end, the Council is to cooperate with the Free
Trade Commission established under Article 2001(1) of the NAFTA to effect the environ-
mental objectives of the NAFTA." The implication of this provision is that the NAFTA
would treat as an unfair trade practice any action from which a Party derives economic
benefit as a result of failure to enforce environmental laws and regulations.
To provide the Council with the expertise needed to develop and implement recom-
mendations for improvement of environmental quality, the Environmental Side
Agreement calls for the formation of the Secretariat. The Secretariat is headed by an
Executive Director, who appoints staff members and experts as are necessary to carry out
the duties of resolving lower-level disputes, as well as for conducting fact-finding for dis-
putes to be resolved by the Council, and for providing technical and administrative sup-
port to the Council. In addition, the Secretariat is to provide "technical, administrative and
operational support to the council,35 and to provide the Parties and the public [with] infor-
mation. . . and expertise with respect to environmental matters." Thus, the Secretariat is
intended as a full-time staff of environmental experts and administrators who oversee the
day to day operation and implementation of the Environmental Side Agreement.
28. Miller, supra note 25, at 516.
29. See e.g., Environmental Side Agreement, Article 10(1)(b).
30. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 9(1).
31. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 9(3)(a). Special sessions may be called at the request of
any Party. Article 9(3)(b).
32. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 10()(b).
33. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 10(6)(c).
34. Article 10(2) calls for the Executive Director of the Secretariat to appoint staff members based
upon their "efficiency, competence and integrity."
35. See generally, Environmental Side Agreement, Article 11; Miller, supra note 25, at 518-519.
36. Environmental Side Agreement, Art. 11(5), (6).
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2 Dispute Resolution under the Environmental Side Agreement
The Parties to the Environmental Side Agreement have provided for resolution of dis-
putes brought by both governmental and non-governmental parties. For interpretation
and application of the Agreement, and to resolve disputes arising under the Agreement,
the Parties may address concerns to the Council." In the case of submissions by Parties,
the Agreement provides for a sixty day consultation period following the filing of the sub-
mission, during which Parties are encouraged to "make every attempt to arrive at a mutu-
ally satisfactory resolution of the matter.' ' If the Parties are unable to resolve the dispute
during the consultation period, the Council may, by a two-thirds vote, convene an arbitral
hearing by a panel of experts with backgrounds in environmental law or enforcement, or
in international dispute resolution."9 Within 180 days following the arbitral hearing, the
panel must issue an initial report, which becomes final within 60 days following any review
requested by the Parties.' Sanctions may be levied in the form of a monetary assessment
against the offending Party, and if the Party fails to pay the assessment within 180 days, the
Council may order a suspension of NAFTA benefits to that Party."
Actions against member nations by private parties or non-governmental organiza-
tions must be addressed to the Secretariat."2 Following the receipt of the submission, the
Secretariat may request a response from the Party concerned,4' and will decide whether the
matter should be addressed to the Council." Article 14 contains certain criteria which are
to be considered in determining whether to refer a matter to the Council. Those provi-
sions in effect set forth the justiciability requirements for a person or organization to sus-
tain a complaint before the Secretariat.
37. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 10(1)(b), Article 10(1)(c).
38. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 22(4).
39. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 25(2)(a).
40. See generally, Environmental Side Agreement, Article 30-32. These articles set forth the proce-
dural requirements to be followed by the panel and by disputants, as well as the reporting
requirements by the Panel following the hearing.
41. Article 34(4) provides for imposition of monetary assessments against nations found in viola-
tion of the Agreement, unless the nation is found to be in the process of according its practices
with recommendations made by the Panel. The arbitral panel is directed to meet 60 days fol-
lowing the issuance of its final report to determine whether the practices are bring brought into
compliance. Monetary assessments are limited by Annex 34 to no more than .007% of the total
trade in goods between the Parties to the complaint giving rise to the enforcement action. If,
within 180 days following imposition of the sanction, the offending nation has not complied
with the enforcement penalty, Article 36 provides for a suspension of NAFTA benefits to that
nation. Annex 36B limits the suspension to an increase in tariffs imposed by the complaining
Party against the offending Party to the lesser of the tariff that was applicable prior to the date
of entry into the NAFTA, or the Most Favored Nation rate in effect on the date of suspension of
benefits.
42. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 14(1).
43. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 14(2).
44. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 15(1).
wimter 1996 69
Article 14 provides that the Secretariat may consider submissions from private parties
asserting that a signatory nation has failed effectively to enforce its own environmental
laws.4' Article 14(l)(d) contains a limitation effectively barring actions directed toward
"harassing industry," rather than at "promoting enforcement." Furthermore, the Article
requires the Secretariat to consider whether the "submission alleges harm to the person or
organization making the submission;" and whether the submitting person has pursued
remedies available under domestic law.4
If the Secretariat lacks the expertise in a given area, it may engage such outside experts as
required to issue a report on the matter in question.' Once the Secretariat reaches a decision
on referral, that determination is published by the Executive Director in an Opinion Letter.
If the Secretariat finds it appropriate, it may develop a factual record for review by the
Council.' Artide 15 gives the Parties a 45 day period in which to comment upon the report
prior to consideration by the Council.' The decision to make public the Secretariat report
rests with the Council, which may elect whether to do so by a two-thirds vote."'
I. Recent Commission Decisions
In the past nine months, the Commission has considered three complaints.,
Significantly, all three actions were filed with the Secretariat by non-governmental parties
under the private action provisions contained in Artide 14. While several critics of the
Environmental Side Agreement have noted that resolution under the Agreement may be
time consuming, in each case the Secretariat has responded in less than ninety days. The
Secretariat has also demonstrated a willingness to force compliance with the justiciability
requirements of Article 14. While subjecting the Environmental Side Agreement to criti-
cism for "formalism," the decisions represent the first steps toward making environmen-
tal dispute resolution under the Agreement a realistic process which may provide substan-
tial benefits to the Parties and to non-governmental parties.
45. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 14(1).
46. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 14(2)(a), (c).
47. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 13(2)(f), Article 13(1).
48. Id.
49. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 15(5).
50. Environmental Side Agreement, Article 15.
51. On January 17, 1996 the CEC received a petition in a matter designated SEM-96- 001.
Although the Secretariat has not ruled on this submission as of press time, the submission is
discussed more fully infra.
52. International Trade: Logging Rider does not Constitute Failure to Enforce Laws, Commission
Rules, 1995 Daily Report for Executives: Regulation, Economics and Law 231 (BNA)
(December 12, 1995), at d31.
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A. Pre-NAFTA: New River Issues
One issue which might have been resolved under the Environmental Side Agreement
arose so early in the process that the Secretariat was not yet in place to address the issue.
However, it is discussed here to illustrate both the need for resolution proceedings for pri-
vate parties and the type of issue which may be addressed by the Secretariat in the future.
The New River begins near Mexicali, Mexico, and carries sewage, industrial wastes,
pesticides and other hazardous materials some 75 miles before depositing them in the
Salton Sea in Imperial County, California. 3 Tests by the California Regional Water Quality
Management Board indicate the presence of DDT, Toxaphene, sewage and metals in the
water, as well as in fish and sediments found in the river. ' In December 1993, the Board of
Supervisors of Imperial County, together with citizen groups from both the U.S. and
Mexico, sought to be the first to use the Environmental Side Agreement as a dispute reso-
lution mechanism. Those groups filed a petition requesting that the EPA use the NAFTA
to address the issue of transboundary pollution along the New River.ss
The EPA declined to address those concerns to the Council, ruling that "the EPA and
other agencies of the U.S. Government [had] just begun the process of implementing the
[Environmental Side Agreement], and that enforcement was at that time impossible
because of the incompleteness of the institutions required to address the issue."s
The EPA decision went on to point out that resolution under the Environmental Side
Agreement requires a showing of a "'persistent pattern of non-enforcement' of environ-
mental law. 7 Because the Environmental Side Agreement had been in place only since
January 1, 1994, and covered only events occurring subsequent to that date, the EPA ruled
there could be no such pattern.' In a noteworthy dictum, however, the EPA went on to
suggest that the petitioners address their grievances directly to the government of Mexico
which, under Article 6 of the Environmental Side Agreement, is required to give requests
of private parties "due consideration in accordance with the law.'
The situation in the New River dispute is an excellent example of the type of situation
which might now be adequately addressed under the Environmental Side Agreement.
Specifically, Ley General requires that industrial facilities treat wastes prior to introduction
into sewers and receiving waters." If the complainants could allege a pattern of non-
enforcement taking place since the Environmental Side Agreement became effective, those
53. Kotvis, supra note 13, at 30.
54. Environmental Protection Agency Response to Citizens' Petition, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,722 (March 23,
1994). It should be pointed out that those same tests indicate that a significant portion of the
pesticides found in the water are a result of runoff from Imperial County farming operations
and residues contained in the soils since the banning of DDT in the 1970s.




59. Id. See Environmental Side Agreement Article 6(l), "Each Party shall ensure that interested per-
sons may request the Party's competent authorities to investigate alleged violations of its envi-
ronmental laws and regulations and shall give such requests due consideration in accordance
with the law."
60. Id. at 13,722.
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impact data, the Cozumel Submission contends that the data falls short of the criteria set
forth in Ley GeneraPt and applicable regulations and local ordinances.'
The Center also argues that the development "presumably has started to damage the
ecosystem of Paradise Reef" Moreover, according to the Cozumel Submission, Paradise
Reef is a part of a Grand Carribbean ecosystem, and is thus a "community asset of North
America'"'9 Therefore, the Cozumel Submission requests that the Secretariat initiate an
investigation of Mexico's failure to apply its environmental laws and regulations in the case
of the Cozumel Shipping Terminal.'
It is difficult to predict the outcome of the Cozumel Submission. While the com-
plainants have alleged a persistent pattern of failure to enforce existing environmental law,
the Secretariat has previously demonstrated prudence in requiring a showing of demon-
strable harm to the submitting party. While the submission alleges that the pier and devel-
opment "presumably have begun to damage the ecosystem of Paradise Reef,"" there is no
direct allegation of significant harm. Moreover, the Secretariat has consistently followed
the Article 14(2)(c) requirement that submitting parties show they have pursued the pri-
vate remedies available under the laws of Parties."3 In the Cozumel Submission, the
Center has raised an issue which will require the Secretariat to distinguish further its crite-
ria for preparing an Article 15 record upon requests by non-governmental organizations.
Given recent submissions by environmental groups, the private party submission provi-
sion is likely to become the most often used - if not the most successful - basis for sub-
missions under the Side Agreement. However, as the Commission and the Secretariat con-
tinue to define justiciability criteria under these provisions, the private party submission
mechanism will help the Environmental Side Agreement continue to develop as the most
environment-friendly trade agreement in history.
We have seen that, less than two years following its consummation, the Environmental
Side Agreement has begun to provide examples by which attorneys, business persons and
legal scholars may begin to understand the workings and functions of the different offices
within the NAFTA bureaucracy. Moreover, the Secretariat and the Council have begun to
fulfill their duties, and show great potential for providing the expertise and balance the
drafters expected. With respect to the dispute resolution mechanism, the Secretariat has
demonstrated that it possesses both the expertise and the restraint necessary to function in
an adequate and impartial manner. While unlikely to satisfy either staunch environmen-
talists or strongly pro-industrial interests, the Side Agreement has been shown to be an
excellent document, with an outstanding potential for growth. The Environmental Side
Agreement can be expected to continue to serve as a model for international environmen-
tal accords to be established in the future.
97. See Ley GeneralArticle 28, 32.
98. These regulations include the Environmental Impact Regulations promulgated under Ley
General; decrees establishing the Cozumel Marine Wildlife Refuge (June 11, 1980); and the
Cozumel Municipal Zoning Ordinance (March 9,1987).
99. Cozumel Submission, Paragraph 11(5).
100. Cozumel Submission, Paragraph Ill(1)(A).
101. Cozumel Submission, Paragraph VI(1).
102. Cozumel Submission, Paragraph 11(5).
103. See Endangered Species Act Submission and Logging Rider Submission, supra.
